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BRINGING NEW LIFE TO ENTERPRISE
ZONES: CONGRESS FINALLY TAKES
THE FIRST STEP WITH THE HOUSING
AND COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT
ACT OF 1987
I. INTRODUCTION
There are no easy solutions to the problems presented by America's
depressed inner cities. Clearly, the traditional approach to this prob-
lem has failed. After years of federal renewal projects, inner cities re-
main locked in a downward spiral of decay and poverty.1 The
enterprise zone is an alternative approach. This Note examines each
element of the enterprise zone concept2 and describes the first federal
enterprise zone act, the Housing and Community Development Act of
1987 (HCDA).3 In addition, this Note addresses the need for more
comprehensive federal enterprise zone legislation.
1. "Despite Great Society intentions and years of experience with federal anti-pov-
erty programs the condition of many inner-city areas is disastrous." Boeck, The Enter-
prise Zone Debate, 16 URB. LAW. 71, 74 (1984) (quoting Kemp's Urban Magic, THE
NEW REPUBLIC, Aug. 23, 1980, at 5-6. See also Enterprise Zones: Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on Economic Stabilization of the House Comm. on Banking, Finance and
Urban Affairs, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 16 (1982) (statement by Rep. McKinney).
2. The enterprise zone concept is based on the employment of market forces and the
reduction of government interference in distressed areas. This Note focuses solely on
the use of enterprise zones in the inner cities. Rural and urban enterprise zone propos-
als share many similar elements. See Boeck, supra note 1, at 86 for a discussion of
various proposals to apply enterprise zones to rural areas.
3. 42 U.S.C. §§ 11501-11505 (1988). Congress passed the HCDA on Dec. 21, 1987.
President Reagan signed the Act into law on Feb. 5, 1988.
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The roots of America's urban crisis are unclear. Stuart Butler of the
Heritage Foundation theorizes that in post-World War II America, in-
creased mobility coupled with high inner-city property values spurred
migration of skilled and middle-income workers from the cities to the
suburbs.4 This exodus left behind those who were unable to move -
the unskilled, unemployed, and poverty stricken.5 Inner-city busi-
nesses soon followed their more affluent customers to the suburbs.6
This phenomenon, over time, severely depleted the urban tax base, re-
ducing the urban government's ability to provide necessary services.
7
Escalating crime rates and deteriorating infrastructure exacerbated this
problem by creating an increased demand for government services.8
This process, according to Butler, has produced ever-expanding pock-
ets of blight in many inner-cities.
Cities have generally responded to this problem in one of three ways:
increased property taxes, redistribution of available revenues, or virtual
abandonment of the worst areas in favor of the more manageable ones.
Obviously, none of these "solutions" is acceptable. Increased property
taxes and redistributive programs provide an incentive for the remain-
ing inner-city property owners to leave, removing even more resources
from the tax base.9 Writing off an area as unsalvageable dooms that
4. S. BuTLER, ENTERPRISE ZONES: GREENLINING THE INNER CITIES 7-10 (1981)
(detailed discussion of the migration of population from inner cities to suburbs and its
effect on the urban tax base).
5. Id.
6. Id. at 11. The departure of affluent residents has encouraged the migration of
business, especially large retail businesses, out of the inner city. Smaller firms, who
traditionally benefit from the spillover business of larger stores, are forced to either
leave the area or close.
7. Id. at 14-18. Urban governments rely on residents within their jurisdiction for
revenue. The urban tax base is weakened as those residents leave the jurisdiction.
8. The correlation between departure of residents and businesses and increased de-
mand for city-provided infrastructure services is clear. Private expenditure for building
maintenance drops as affluent residents and businesses leave an area. Building owners
are unable to attract residential or business tenants due to the undesirability of the area.
These landlords can no longer afford upkeep expenses or taxes, leading to increased
abandonment. This process is self-perpetuating as more buildings fall into disrepair.
Crime rates escalate as the unemployed and poverty stricken lose hope. Cities are even-
tually unable to meet the ever-increasing demand for infrastructure support. Id.
9. Affluent residents, faced with choosing between remaining in cities, which entails
increased taxes, or moving to another area to avoid this burden, will generally choose
the latter. K. BRADBURY, A. DOWNS, & K. SMALL, URBAN DECLINE AND THE Fu-
TURE OF AMERICA'S CIES 215 (1982).
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area's residents to an existence of hopeless poverty.1 ° Acting alone,
cities are powerless to reverse the downward trend of their depressed
areas'. 11
The federal government poured billions of dollars into cities to help
them reverse urban decay. By 1979, almost half of the federal budget
went to direct transfer payments, with nearly one quarter of the
nondefense budget spent in central cities.12 These expenditures have
not only proven ineffective,' 3 they may have contributed to the prob-
lem by imposing development plans ill-suited to local needs. 4
II. THE ENTERPRISE ZONE CONCEPT
The enterprise zone concept, which originated in Great Britain,' 5
challenges the effectiveness of direct expenditure programs.1 6 This
concept designates blighted urban areas as eligible for federal and local
tax and regulatory incentives designed to attract commercial activity.
17
Proponents of enterprise zones view high taxes and cumbersome regu-
lations as obstacles to economic growth in depressed areas."8 The con-
cept's goal is to remove these obstacles in order to build "a climate in
which people are encouraged to use the latent strengths of an area" to
10. See S. BUTLER, supra note 4, at 3 (writing off blighted areas would be self-
defeating).
11. K. BRADBURY, supra note 9, at 215.
12. Boeck, supra note 1, at 74 (if the poor were directly given all federal anti-pov-
erty expenditures, every American would be above the poverty level).
13. "The reality remains, however, that years of federal efforts and billions of dol-
lars have not brought forth prosperity and full employment.. . ." S. BUTLER, supra
note 4, at 70 (quoting U.S. Rep. Shirley Chisholm). Federal direct expenditure pro-
grams are not cost effective in part because of inefficient design and implementation.
See generally infra note 14. The continued deterioration of the condition of the inner
cities is evidence of the ineffectiveness of these programs.
14. Because the plans are designed for the country as a whole, they may be wasteful
in communities whose needs are unique. Additionally, many of these programs have
suffered from the political process. All too often, development grants go to politically
attractive projects at the expense of truly beneficial ones. Butler, Enterprise Zones: Pio-
neering in the Inner City, in NEw TooLs FOR ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT: THE EN-
TERPRISE ZoNE, DEVELOPMENT BANK, AND RFC 25 (G. Sterulieb & D. Listokin ed.
1981).
15. Boeck, supra note 1, at 76.
16. Id. at 74.
17. Callies & Tamashiro, Enterprise Zones The Redevelopment Sweepstakes Begins,
15 URB. LAw. 231 (1983).
18. See S. BUTLER, supra note 4, at 22.
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create opportunity.1 9
Critics of enterprise zones argue that designating limited areas for
special tax treatment would simply create tax havens for large busi-
nesses without increasing local employment or welfare.20 Enterprise
zone proponents, however, propose the creation of new small busi-
nesses within the zone as the key element to future growth.21 The first
priority in redeveloping distressed areas is job creation.2 2 Studies show
that small businesses are best suited to create the kinds of jobs23 that
are needed in distressed areas.24 For these reasons, the incentive pack-
age of an enterprise zone must target the development of small
businesses.25
A. Zone Designation
The success of an enterprise zone program largely depends on accu-
rately identifying which areas would benefit the most as an enterprise
zone.26 The eligibility criteria employed, therefore, must target only
19. Id.
20. COMPTROLLER GENERAL, REPORT TO THE CONGRESS: REVITALIZING DIs-
TRESSED AREAS THROUGH ENTERPRISE ZONES: MANY UNCERTAINTIES EXIST, 97th
Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1982) [hereinafter COMPTROLLER GENERAL REPORT] (tax incen-
tives, unless tied to hiring requirements, may create few jobs); see Callies & Tamashiro,
supra note 17, at 283 (zones would attract only large and profitable firms, providing few
jobs).
21. SMALL BusINEss ADMINISTRATION, BUSINESS IMPACTS OF STATE ENTER-
PRISE ZONES (Jan. 15, 1986) ("Small business is largely responsible for the successs of
[state] enterprise zones.").
22. See Boeck, supra note 1, at 77 (business must generate new jobs and provide a
safety ladder for advancement).
23. "Small firms are the most effective creators of jobs in the economy." Butler,
supra note 14, at 25; see also D. BIRCH, JOB GENERATION PROCESS 17, 20 (1979) (from
1969-1976 small business created 66% of net new jobs in the U.S.).
24. Butler, supra note 14, at 25 (small firms provide the type of jobs most suitable to
the inner city, jobs for young, unskilled workers); see also S. BUTLER, supra note 4, at
83.
25. The importance of small business to urban neighborhoods is evidenced by the
precipitous decline these areas suffered after the departure of small businesses. S. BUT-
LER, supra note 4, at 159 (tax incentives should be geared primarily to the problems
facing small businessmen); see also Cohadas, Urban Enterprise Zone Plan Stresses Busi-
ness Tax Breaks, 39 CONG. Q. 805 (1981).
26. In the British program the Home Secretary, upon nomination by local agencies,
designates zones. See infra notes 102-103 and accompanying text. The American pro-
gram generally follows the British pattern, in that local nomination is followed by
designation by the Secretary of Housing and Urban Development (HUD). See supra
note 3.
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the most desperate areas and must accurately represent the economic
condition in a potential zone.27 Consequently, most American propos-
als base designation on an area's economic history and its potential for
growth.28
The most common eligibility criteria are unemployment rate, popu-
lation decline, percentage of population below the poverty level, and
Urban Development Action Grant (UDAG) eligibility.29 Different
proposals set varying eligibility levels for each of these criteria.3° The
criteria listed above are embodied in the Housing and Community De-
velopment Act, discussed in detail in Section IV of this Note. l
Designation of enterprise zones under most American proposals is a
competitive process. 32 Proponents of zones envision an initially lim-
ited, experimental approach.33 Therefore, most suggested programs
limit the number and duration of zones.34
B. Tax Incentives
Although some critics view the tax system as an expensive and inef-
fective tool for spurring growth,35 taxation is critical to the implemen-
tation of governmental policy.36 In fact, many commentators believe
that the tax system is a less expensive means of regulating activity than
27. See Boeck, supra note 1, at 89 (the debate over eligibility tests is not a preoccu-
pation with trivialities).
28. Id. at 87-89 (discussion of various eligibility requirements embodied in bils in-
troduced in Congress); see also Freilich, The New Federalism, American Urban Policy in
the 1980"s: Trends and Directions in Urban, State and Local Government Law, 15 URn.
LAW. 159, 196-97 (1983).
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. See infra note 132 and accompanying text.
32. See S. BUTLER, supra note 4, at 131-32 (describing process whereby state and
local governments present their incentive plan and the most attractive packages are
designated).
33. COMPTROLLER GENERAL REPORT, supra note 20, at v (programs should be
experimental because of uncertainty as to effectiveness and cost).
34. Callies & Tamashiro, supra note 17, at 237 (comparison of S. 2298 [Reagan Bill]
and H.R. 3824 [Kemp Bill] limits on number and duration of zones).
35. COMPTROLLER GENERAL REPORT, supra note 20, at 5 (general discussion of
criticisms regarding use of tax incentives to spur business growth); see also NATIONAL
URBAN LEAGUE, CAN ENTERPRISE ZONES WORK FOR Us? 43 (1982) (discussing the
high costs of lost revenue).
36. J. JENSEN, PROPERTY TAX IN THE UNrrED STATES 125 (1931) ("Tax incen-
tives have been used to stimulate industry in America since colonial days.").
1989]
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direct expenditures.37 Conventional wisdom also suggests that lower-
ing the costs of doing business will create business opportunities for
more people. While the most effective combination of tax incentives
remains elusive, most enterprise zone proposals share common
incentives.
The biggest problem facing potential entrepreneurs is insufficient
start-up capital.3" Normally an entrepreneur can obtain capital fund-
ing from financial institutions, investors, or personal savings.39 In
blighted areas, however, these traditional sources of start-up capital are
not available." Effective use of the tax system can correct this prob-
lem. Almost all of the enterprise zone bills introduced in Congress
since 1980 contain tax incentives designed to increase investment.41
Stuart Butler suggests the following incentives: allowing investors in
small firms to establish a loss reserve; deferring capital gains taxes on
investments in zone firms, so long as proceeds are reinvested within the
zone; and allowing zone firms to pass on operating losses to investors.42
Representatives Kemp and Garcia propose elimination of the capital
gains tax in enterprise zones.43 The theory underlying such proposals
is that increased private investment in zone businesses will create a
pool of start-up capital sufficient to encourage entrepreneurship. 44
37. Zelinsky, Efficiency and Income Taxes: The Rehabilitation of Tax Incentives, 64
T x. L. REv. 973, 977 (1986) (costs of using the tax system to influence businesses may
be less than the cost of implementing direct expenditure programs).
38. "Unless entrepreneurs can access this seed capital, they will be unable to get
started and generate new employment." Hearings on S. 1829 and S. 2298 Before the
Subcomm. on Savings, Pensions, and Investment Policy of the Senate Comm. on Finance,
97th Cong., 2d Sess. 201 (1982) [hereinafter Hearings on S. 1829 and S. 2298] (testi-
mony of W. Norris, Control Data Corp.); see also NATIONAL URBAN LEAGUE, supra
note 35, at 47 (availability of capital seed money is essential for small business).
39. See S. BUTLER, supra note 4, at 148-51 for a discussion of normal methods of
start-up capital financing.
40. NATIONAL URBAN LEAGUE, supra note 35, at 47 (causes of scarcity of start-up
capital in depressed areas include poor credit ratings, lack of personal savings, and view
that investment in small businesses in depressed areas is unwise).
41. COMPTROLLER GENERAL REPORT, supra note 20, at 43, app. I (chart of first
nine enterprise zone bills introduced in Congress, showing major provisions of each).
42. S. BUTLER, supra note 4, at 148-51 (giving zone firms status similar to that of
subchapter S corporations).
43. See S. BUTLER, supra note 4, at 131-32 for a general description of the Kemp-
Garcia Bill, H.R. 3824, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982); see also Boeck, supra note 1, at 100.
04 (description of various proposed investment incentives).
44. Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Economic Stabilization of the House Comm. on
Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 12-14 (1982) (testimony of
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Another proposed tax code change that will benefit zones is the em-
ployer tax credit. In 1982 the Reagan Administration, as part of its
enterprise zone bill, recommended that employers receive tax credits
based on wages paid to employees who work primarily in the zone.45
Variations on this proposal are present in many of the bills considered
by Congress.46 These incentives are designed to offset the high cost of
employing unskilled workers in depressed areas, thereby encouraging
increased employment within the zones.47
Other suggested tax incentives include a business income tax credit
for zone businesses.4 8 Critics contend that this incentive would have
no value to new small businesses, as they have little or no excludable
income.49 Proponents argue that the concept is more than just a pack-
age of tax incentives; it is a comprehensive attempt to remove all gov-
ernment burdens, and reducing taxation furthers that goal.50
Other proposals include incentives such as employee tax credits, loss
carry-overs, accelerated depreciation, and reduced social security
taxes.51 Due to the novel nature of the enterprise zone concept, it re-
mains unclear which incentives have the greatest potential for success.
Rep. Kemp) [hereinafter Economic Stabilization Hearings]. Representative Kemp notes
that changes in the tax code created massive investment in money-market funds, "where
the money just sits there." He proposes a change in the code which will make invest-
ment in zones more attractive than other types of investments. Id.
45. STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 97TH CONG., 2D SEss., DESCRIPTION
OF S. 2298, ENTERPRISE ZONE TAX ACT OF 1982 (employers are allowed nonrefund-
able tax credit of 10% of wages paid to employees if 90% of the employees' services are
directly related to zone business and 50% of the services are performed within the
zone); see also Boeck, supra note 1, at 115 (description of various employer tax credits).
46. See supra note 41.
47. Hearings on S. 1829 and S. 2298, supra note 38, at 155 (testimony of John
Chapoton, Assistant Secretary for Tax Policy, Dept. of the Treasury) ("There are two
... [incentives:] payroll credits for businesses... designed to encourage creation of new
employment... [and] a targeted incentive to encourage hiring ... of disadvantaged
individuals.").
48. Boeck, supra note 1, at 97-98 (proposals range from a flat 50% exclusion of
business income to an exclusion indexed to the amount of income a business receives).
49. Id. at 98-99 ("Most new businesses record no profits for the first seven or eight
years.").
50. Reducing income taxes in zones demonstrates a commitment by government to
redevelop those areas, increasing the confidence of investors and entrepreneurs. Hear-
ings on S 1829 and S. 2298, supra note 38, at 132 (testimony of Samuel Pierce, Secre-
tary of HUD).
51. See Boeck, supra note 1, at 97-122 for a detailed description of various incentive
proposals.
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C. Regulatory Relief
The quantity and complexity of governmental economic regulation
imposes a substantial obstacle to potential entrepreneurs.5 2 Zone pro-
ponents seek to remove this barrier of prohibitive state and federal reg-
ulation, the burden of which falls "particularly heavily on the small
business sector."53 Stuart Butler argues that the implementation of the
Regulatory Flexibility Act5" will reduce regulatory burdens.55 The
Act allows agencies to clarify, consolidate, or simplify compliance and
reporting requirements for small businesses and exempts small busi-
nesses entirely from certain rules.56 Although critics contend the Act
has been ineffective, 7 the Small Business Administration views it as
potentially beneficial to smaller firms.s
One Reagan Administration proposal allows federal agencies to
waive or modify regulations only upon the request of both the state and
local governments. 9 This plan exempts from waiver or modification
those regulations imposed pursuant to statutory authority, as well as
those whose waiver would present a risk to health or safety.6" Other
proposals include modification of the Occupational Safety and Health
Act6" and Environmental Protection Agency regulations.6 2
Proposals to reduce regulation of economic activity in enterprise
zones face several criticisms. Exempting limited areas from regulation
52. Boeck, supra note 1, at 125-26.
53. Government regulation is especially burdensome on small business due to lack
of resources and expertise. In the context of distressed areas, this burden is magnified
by lack of education and, most importantly, lack of business experience. S. BUTLER,
supra note 4, at 57-58.
54. 5 U.S.C. §§ 601-612 (1982).
55. Boeck, supra note 1, at 126.
56. Id. (citing 5 U.S.C. §§ 603(c), 610 (1982)).
57. Congress approved the Act so recently that insufficient data is available for a
meaningful evaluation of its effectiveness. Id.
58. Id. at 126-27.
59. Enterprise Zone Tax Act of 1982, H.R. 6009, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982); see
also companion bill, S. 2298, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982); Boeck, supra note 1, at 128-
29.
60. Id.
61. 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-678 (1976).
62. Different areas suffer from widely diverse sets of problems. Flexibility is, there-
fore, the most logical approach to solving these problems. See Boeck, supra note 1, at
127-28 for a general discussion of proposed regulatory relief.
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creates a potential equal protection challenge. 3 Businesses located just
outside the zones might argue that the zone program unfairly benefits
zone firms." This criticism ignores the fact that enterprise zones, by
definition, are areas where the cost of doing business is higher than in
surrounding areas.65 Rather than giving zone firms an advantage, lim-
ited regulatory relief would simply offset increased business expenses in
the zone.66
Critics contend that enterprise zones are a disguised attempt to avoid
government regulation.67  Federal deregulation, these critics argue,
simply shifts the cost of protecting the public to local governments.6 8
While enterprise zones do depend on substantial local and state com-
mitments, the zone concept encourages creative and innovative experi-
ments at all levels of government. The concept also gives state and
local governments flexibility to tailor their contributions to suit local
resources and needs.69 Enterprise zoning replaces the traditional sys-
tem of central federal planning with a system that is flexible enough to
respond to unique local needs.70 As economic activity gains momen-
tum in the zones, the increased private investment and initiative would
offset the higher costs initially imposed on state and local govern-
ments.7 1 Finally, proponents claim that enterprise zones will not re-
place federal urban programs, 2 but will be implemented in
63. Enterprise zone benefits, by definition, are not distributed equally to all areas or
businesses. However, this unequal treatment is rationally related to the compelling state
interest in revitalizing the depressed areas. Additionally, such unequal treatment is ra-
tionally based on the dissimilar needs of different areas. Id. at 127.
64. Cohadas, supra note 25, at 806 (rules, regulations, taxes, and licensing require-
ments detrimental to businesses in a zone also harm competitors outside the zone, yet
nonzone businesses would not get relief).
65. Butler, supra note 14, at 37 (if the relief is designed correctly, the result would
be equality of total costs of doing business between zone and neighboring firms); see also
COMPTROLLER GENERAL REPORT, supra note 20, at 8-9.
66. Id.
67. Callies & Tamashiro, supra note 17, at 247.
68. Id.
69. See generally supra note 50.
70. A flexible program, in contrast to direct expenditure plans, meets the diverse
needs of different areas. Id.
71. See generally Hearings on S. 1829 and S. 2298, supra note 38, at 174 (testimony
of John Brown, Governor of Kentucky) Governor Brown stated that "Etihere is little
direct investment of tax dollars. Here you are making productive areas of localities that
are at this point nonproductive." Id.
72. See Economic Stabilization Hearings, supra note 44, at 3 (statement of Rep.
Kemp).
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conjunction with programs such as infrastructure grants, public hous-
ing, and rehabilitation grants."
D. Local Commitments
The third element of the enterprise zone concept is commitment by
local and state governments to provide their own incentives for growth.
Some commentators suggest the relationship between the federal, state,
and local governments is contractual7 4 in that the federal government
offers a package of incentives to eligible cities in exchange for the cities'
promises to make certain changes at the local level.75 In this way, "en-
terprise zones would not represent merely a federal incentive, but an
effort by all levels of government to remove from the zones their nones-
sential impediments to economic activity."7 6
Proponents of the enterprise zone concept identify several areas of
local regulation as targets for change. One area is land use restric-
tions.77 Zoning laws often prevent property owners from devoting
their property to its most efficient use, resulting in misallocation of re-
sources and reduced property values.7 8 These laws replace the effect of
market forces with centralized planning, perpetuating unproductive
land use and waste of resources. In addition, zoning prohibits the es-
tablishment of some new businesses by restricting the number and type
of activities within an area.7 9 Advocates of enterprise zones, therefore,
urge building code revisions. While critics argue that building codes
protect the health and safety of the public, proponents believe such
codes are often outdated or poorly suited to particular local needs and
73. Theoretically, if the enterprise zone successfully revitalizes blighted areas, other
federal programs such as housing, infrastructure, and rehabilitation grants would no
longer be necessary. Id.
74. S. BUTLER, supra note 4, at 143 ("A more productive approach would be a
negotiated contract between the federal government and the city."); see also Butler,
supra note 14, at 37-41.
75. Id.
76. Callies & Tamashiro, supra note 17, at 244 (quoting DEPARTMENT OF HoUSINo
AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT, THE ADMINISTRATION'S ENTERPRISE ZONE PROPOSAL,
March 1982, at 16 (paper released with S. 2298)).
77. Calles & Tamashiro, supra note 17, at 244-45; see also Boeck, supra note 1, at
140.
78. See Callies & Tamashiro, supra note 17, at 245.
79. Zoning laws inherently restrict the variety of activities in certain areas and often
fail to reflect the present needs of a given area. Id.
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provide minimal protection. 0
Proponents of enterprise zones advocate changes in local taxation,
including a reduction in local property taxes.8" Critics who argue that
financially drained local governments cannot afford to lose this prop-
erty tax revenue8 2 fail to recognize that target areas are currently non-
productive and have depressed property values.8" Such areas now
yield little or no revenue regardless of the tax rate.8 4 Consequently,
reduction of property tax rates would eventually increase net revenue
by generating business activity and enhancing property values.8 5
Local governments would also provide increased services under
many proposals.3 6 The Reagan Administration suggests that more lo-
cal services can be provided by "increasing local resources devoted to
such services and [by] relying on the private sector to provide serv-
ices."8 7 In particular need of improvement are basic local infrastruc-
ture services upon which urban neighborhoods depend. 8
Private sector involvement is also a key element to the success of
enterprise zones. The Reagan Administration suggests that private
sector involvement will improve the quality and reduce the costs of
local services 9 by introducing market competition.90 Private firms
would absorb the cost of services they provide, further lessening the
80. Id. Building codes thwart economic activity by imposing unnecessary costs on
business and developers, while the same results could often be achieved through cheaper
methods. Id. See also Boeck, supra note 1, at 141 (general discussion of the problems
caused by building codes).
81. Boeck, supra note 1, at 141.
82. Id. at 131.
83. Id. at 133.
84. If an area does not produce revenue for the local government, the tax rate ap-
plied to that area is irrelevant. Butler, supra note 14, at 38.
85. S. BUTLER, supra note 4, at 135.
86. Boeck, supra note 1, at 136. The author argues that "local governments would
be expected to improve the quality of other services they provide in a zone. When
services are inadequate... the costs of doing business escalate." Id.
87. Id.; see also Callies & Tamashiro, supra note 17, at 243-44 (general discussion of
Kemp and Reagan proposals).
88. Boeck, supra note 1, at 136 (services include sewers, water, public transporta-
tion, police and fire protection, road maintenance, garbage collection).
89. See supra note 87.
90. Boeck, supra note 1, at 136-37 (this proposal "will replace government monop-
oly with market competition, which will reduce costs and improve quality of services;
will reduce the opportunity for corruption; will eliminate bureaucratic inertia").
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burden on local government.91 Additionally, the Reagan Administra-
tion recommends forming neighborhood associations92 which could be-
come involved in planning and directing the development of the
community. 93
In sum, the enterprise zone concept requires the efforts of all levels
of government to revitalize depressed inner cities.94 Each element of
such a program is designed to reduce the current obstacles to develop-
ment in inner cities. As proposed in the United States, the enterprise
zone program would supplement rather than replace existing develop-
ment programs.95
III. HISTORY OF ENTERPRISE ZONES
A. The British Zones
Professor Peter Hall of Great Britain created the concept of enter-
prise zones, using Hong Kong and Taiwan as models.96 Professor Hall
noted a correlation between the fantastic growth in these areas and the
relative lack of governmental interference they enjoyed.97 Sir Geoffrey
Howe, a member of Britain's Conservative government, promoted Pro-
fessor Hall's philosophy.98
The Local Government Planning and Land Act, enacted by the Brit-
ish Parliament in 1980, established enterprise zones.99 The Act autho-
rizes the Home Secretary to designate a zone upon nomination by a
local government."° Upon designation, businesses in the zone are
granted various tax reductions and relaxation of regulations.1 0 1 The
91. Id. at 137.
92. Id.
93. Economic Stabilization Hearings, supra note 44, at 10 (testimony of Rep.
Kemp); see also Boeck, supra note 1, at 143-48.
94. See supra note 76 and accompanying text.
95. See supra note 72.
96. Boeck, supra note 1, at 76.
97. Id.
98. "Within these zones ... everything possible should be done to maximize eco-
nomic freedom. Taxation should be reduced and regulation should be cut. No govern-
ment plan for redevelopment should be imposed on the area." S. BUTLER, supra note 4,
at 2 (quoting Sir Geoffrey Howe, speech to Britain's Bow Group, June 20, 1978).
99. Local Government Planning and Land Act ch. 65, § 179 (1980). The Act is a
watered-down version of Professor Hall's proposal. S. BUTLER, supra note 4, at 126.
100. S. BUTLER, supra note 4, at 103-07 (the Secretary may designate zones upon
local nomination).
101. Id. (general description of incentives offered under British plan).
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British program requires local government commitments to reduce
taxes and regulations.1"2 The national government, however, guaran-
tees reimbursement of any loss in local governmental revenue.10 3 In
addition, the Act encourages the creation of free trade zones within the
enterprise zones.' °4
Reviews of the British program's effectiveness are mixed. While
some areas have experienced dramatic growth, others have not.'o5 The
British experience, however, is not an accurate model for potential
American enterprise zones." 6 The British program focuses on in-
creased development of abandoned, underpopulated wastelands,
whereas American programs would target urban areas.'0 7 In addition,
the British program relies on large, established companies to develop
enterprise zones. An American program would focus on the efforts of
new small businesses. 0 8
B. The American Experience
Shortly after Britain enacted its enterprise zone program, the con-
cept gained widespread support in the United States.'0 9 Republicans
and Democrats alike supported enterprise zones, as the alliance be-
tween Representatives Jack Kemp and Robert Garcia demonstrates. 01o
The Reagan Administration also adopted enterprise zones as an inte-
gral part of its domestic economic policy."' Finally, from 1980 to
1984, Congress reviewed at least fourteen enterprise zone bills,'1 2 each
with various combinations of tax and regulatory incentives. 1 3 Con-
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Boeck, supra note 1, at 77.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. S. BUTLER, supra note 4, at 129-30; see also Boeck, supra note 1, at 84-85.
110. "An unlikely congressional partnership is coming back in the 97th Congress
with a revised plan of tax breaks to encourage urban redevelopment." Urban Enterprise
Zone Plan Stresses Business Tax Breaks, 39 CONG. Q. 805 (1981).
111. Id. at 806 (Reagan endorsed the enterprise zone idea during his campaign in
1980).
112. Boeck, supra note 1, at 73 n.1 (lists fourteen bills plus companion bills intro-
duced in Congress through 1984).
113. COMPTROLLER GENERAL REPORT, supra note 20, at 43, app. I (chart showing
elements of nine enterprise zone bills introduced in Congress by 1982); see also Boeck,
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gress ultimately enacted the Housing and Community Development
Act of 1987.114
In contrast to federal inaction, as many as forty states had enacted
their own enterprise zone programs by 1985.115 Additionally, many
local governments promulgated proposals in anticipation of future fed-
eral enterprise zone designation. 116
In 1981 Connecticut passed the first state enterprise zone pro-
gram.' 17 This program, which includes many of the elements con-
tained in most federal proposals,"1 ' received generally favorable
reviews. By June 1986, Connecticut's six zones produced 627 projects,
generated a total investment of 148 million dollars, 9 created 4,961
new jobs, and preserved 4,560 others. 120 While critics contend that
this growth would have occurred without enterprise zones,121 the State
Economic Development Commissioner attributes most of this new eco-
nomic activity to the zone program. 122
New Jersey's program, which is similar to Connecticut's, also met
supra note 1, at 169-72 (detailed discussion of elements of H.R. 1955, 98th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1983); S. 634, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983); H.R. 2375, 98th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1983).
114. US. Enterprise Zones Offer Little to New York, Crain's N. Y. Business, Jan. 18,
1988, at 7 (notes passage of Housing and Community Development Act of 1987).
115. Hartford's Experiment with Enterprise Zones Gathering Mixed Reactions, N.Y.
Times, July 7, 1985, § 2, at 23, col. 1; see also Cuomo's Enterprise Zone Bill Boosts a
Proven Concept, Crain's N. Y. Business, Mar. 17, 1986, at 9 ("Zones have become popu-
lar because dollar for dollar they are a bargain for cities trying to rejuvenate decayed
areas.").
116. Boeck, supra note 1, at 150 ("Even before President Reagan's inauguration,
Cleveland, Miami, Baltimore, and the South Bronx were preparing proposals for federal
enterprise zone designation.").
117. Panel Urges Housing Emphasis in Urban Zones, N.Y. Times, Mar. 8, 1987,
§ 11 CN, at 1, col. 1.
118. NATIONAL URBAN LEAGUE, supra note 35, at 88. The Connecticut program
allows a 50% reduction in corporate taxes for ten years if 30% of employees live in the
zone or are CETA eligible. The plan also includes: 80% abatement of local property
taxes for five years; property improvement assessments deferred for two years; special
job training grants for workers living in zone; $1,000 grant to employers for each full-
time permanent job resulting from new investments. Relocating businesses are ineligi-
ble. Id.
119. See supra note 117.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id.
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with success.123  Under this plan, 497 companies were certified for
zone incentives, more than 160 million dollars in private investment
was committed, and an estimated 6,500 permanent full-time jobs were
created by the end of 1985.124 Other states have also benefitted from
enterprise zones,125 although no data is available regarding the effec-
tiveness of many of the newer state programs. While state programs
typically contain a variety of incentives,126 all are based on the assump-
tion that reductions in government involvement will increase economic
opportunity.
IV. THE HOUSING AND COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT
ACT OF 1987
The Housing and Community Development Act of 1987 includes
the first federal enterprise zone effort.' 27 Title VII of the Act estab-
lishes a very limited enterprise zone program.' 28 Under Title VII, the
Secretary of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) is authorized to
designate up to one hundred zones, each with a life span of twenty-five
years. 2 9 Before designation of any zones, the Act requires HUD to
publish zone regulations. 30 State and local governments must apply
for zone designation and make specific commitments in furtherance of
123. County Struggles to Match Jersey's Surging Economy, N.Y. Times, Nov. 15,
1986, § 1, at 33, col. 2. (50% cut in sales tax in building materials; corporate income tax
credits for hiring the poor; six-year tax abatement on zone buildings).
124. The Renaissance of the Garden State, Crain's N. Y. Business, June 30, 1986, at
11.
125. Saving the Cities, FORBES, Nov. 18, 1985, at 10. This article notes that Arkan-
sas' zones have attracted $417 million in private investments and will create 5,600 new
jobs. Also, in Illinois, more than S500 million has been invested, creating at least 3,500
jobs and saving 5,100. See also Freilich, supra note 28, at 196-97.
126. NATIONAL URBAN LEAGUE, supra note 35 (chart reflecting elements of vari-
ous state programs).
127. A Taste of Enterprise Zones, NATIONAL JOURNAL, Jan. 9, 1988, at 101.
128. 15 Hous. & Dev. Rep. (BNA) 600, 606 (1988).
129. The Act contains a number of eligibility requirements. For example, the area
must be UDAG eligible. It must have an unemployment rate at least 1.5 times the
national rate, and a poverty rate of at least 20%. At least 70% of households must have
incomes below 80% of the median income of surrounding areas. An area is also eligible
if its population declined by at least 20% between 1970 and 1980. 42 U.S.C.
§ 1501(c)(3) (1988).
130. HUD must publish regulations within four months of enactment. 15 Hous. &
Dev. Rep. (BNA) at 606.
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the program. 3' The only authorized form of federal relief is waiver or
modification of HUD regulations upon the request of the state or local
government. 132 The Act contains no federal tax incentive provisions
and forbids assistance to businesses relocating from other areas into the
zone.1 33 HUD is authorized to coordinate the zone program with
other existing development programs.
134
V. ANALYSIS OF THE HOUSING AND COMMUNITY
DEVELOPMENT AcT OF 1987
The enterprise zone provision of the Act represents a significant step
in the right direction. After seven years of debate and repeated at-
tempts to enact legislation, Congress finally acknowledged the substan-
tial value of the enterprise zone concept. Facially this Act provides
nothing of great substance, 135 but it represents that "all-important foot
in the door."' 3 6 Without drastic expansion, however, this program
will not be effective. Because enterprise zones must address a wide
range of problems, token regulatory relief alone will not provide suffi-
cient incentive to business growth.
The Title VII designation provision is the strongest aspect of the
program. To be effective, the program's eligibility criteria must ensure
that the areas designated are truly the most needy. 137 Although many
types and combinations of criteria have been proposed,1 3 8 the most
common criteria are unemployment rate, 139 poverty rate, 140 population
131. 42 U.S.C. § 11501(d) (1988) (state and local actions can include reduced taxes
and fees, increased services, streamlining government regulations, and involvement of
public and private community groups).
132. Id. at § 11504.
133. Id. at § 11501(d)(4).
134. 15 Hous. & Dev. Rep. (BNA) at 606.
135. U.S. Enterprise Zones Offer Little to New York, Crain's New York Business,
Jan. 18, 1988, at 7 ("State officials don't seem very impressed with the federal incen-
fives, which will be limited at first to the waiver of some HUD issued regulations.").
136. Id. (quoting Richard Cowden, executive director of the American Association
of Enterprise Zones). The enterprise zone provision, however, is only a small part of the
Act. This is ironic because the enterprise zone is meant to reduce government involve-
ment in distressed areas, yet the Act represents a $30 billion commitment to continue
such involvement. See 15 Hous. & Dev. Rep. (BNA) at 600-08 for a detailed descrip-
tion of the other provisions of the Act.
137. See generally Boeck, supra note 1, at 87.
138. Id. at 87-90 (general description of various proposed eligibility criteria).
139. Id. at 87 (proposed unemployment rates range from 6% for the preceding six
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decline,14 ' and UDAG criteria.'4 2 The Act's eligibility criteria should
enable decisionmakers to direct the program to the neediest areas. 43
Congress should strengthen the Act's regulatory relief provisions.
While the Act authorizes HUD to waive or modify its regulations,'" it
gives little direction regarding which regulations should be targeted for
modification. Additionally, the Act does not address modification of
regulations issued by agencies other than HUD.' Congress should
consider applying the Regulatory Flexibility Act to enterprise zones.' 4 6
The RFA lightens the regulatory burden on zone firms by giving HUD
the authority to adapt federal regulations to local needs.
State and local governments play a crucial role in enterprise
zones.' 47 The Act provides for the participation of these governments
by requiring them to submit specific plans detailing their commitments
to furthering the program's objectives.' 4 8 In addition, state and local
governments must specify the type of relief they wish to receive. 14 9 By
months under the Paul Bill to 200% of the national average rate under the Kemp-
Garcia Bill).
140. Id. at 87. Poverty rate is determined by identifying the percentage of families
below the poverty level. Under the Paul Bill, any area with a 10% to 15% poverty rate
would be eligible. The Reagan Bill would require a 20% poverty rate, Kemp-Garcia I,
a 50% rate, and Kemp-Garcia II would follow the Census Bureau identification of pov-
erty areas.
141. Id. See also H.R. 1, 99th Cong., Ist Sess. (1985) which proposes criteria of
population decrease of 20% between 1970-1980. This criteria is important because
rapid decreases in population create the very stresses on inner-city areas that result in
blight.
142. Boeck, supra note I, at 88 n. 115. Boeck indicates that eligibility for UDAG is
determined by six criteria: percentage of population below poverty level, percentage of
housing constructed before 1940, growth of per capita income, population growth,
growth in retailing and manaufacturing employment, and unemployment. A city over
50,000 must meet at least three of the six criteria. Id.
143. One criticism of many existing direct expenditure programs is that their eligi-
bility requirements are so broad that less-deserving areas receive assistance, while needy
ones are overlooked. By basing eligibility on the economic factors that create the need,
much of this problem can be avoided.
144. See supra note 132.
145. Agencies such as OSHA and the EPA extensively regulate economic activity.
These regulations are no less burdensome than those issued by HUD. See supra note 62
and accompanying text.
146. See supra notes 43-45 and accompanying text.
147. See supra note 74 and accompanying text.
148. See supra note 131 and accompanying text.
149. See supra note 132 and accompanying text.
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providing flexibility, this provision gives state and local governments
the freedom, subject to final HUD approval, to devise the combination
of incentives most suited to their particular needs. 150
The most glaring defect in the Act is the absence of tax incentives.
Tax modification is the central feature of the enterprise zone con-
cept."' While relaxation of regulations is beneficial, a tax incentive
program provides a direct financial impetus for business growth. Reg-
ulatory relief alone will do little to spur the private investment 5 2 that
is needed to redevelop depressed areas.' 53
The inclusion of tax incentives is imperative to the success of enter-
prise zone programs. Such incentives might include a reduction in the
capital gains tax, increased investment tax credits for investment in
zone firms, and subehapter S status for zone firms.' 54 Other incentives
include reduced business income credits for employers who hire zone
residents and credits for job training. 55 These provisions would en-
courage new small firms in the zones to employ and train zone resi-
dents and would lower the zone firms' business expenses.
The Act should also allow increased participation by volunteer
neighborhood groups and should encourage state and local govern-
ments to assist such groups. In addition, the privatization of tradi-
tional governmental services 56 would enable small zone firms to
employ zone residents to provide services such as street repair, garbage
collection, and building restoration.' 7 Such firms contribute to the
success of zone programs by addressing the problems of unemployment
and the inability of local government to provide these services.
150. State and local governments can create their own package of incentives, choos-
ing from an array of regulatory modifications and possible local actions.
151. See, eg., 39 CONG. Q. 805 (1981).
152. Such relief may have some impact on investment if investors view it as a long-
term commitment by government to the area. However, such a perception would be
greatly enhanced by more substantial incentives. See supra note 50; but cf. Enterprise
Zone Designation Seen Boosting Investment, Daily Report for Executives (BNA), Aug.
28, 1986, at 1.
153. See Economic Stabilization Hearings, supra note 44, at 12-14.
154. See supra notes 38-42 and accompanying text.
155. See supra notes 45-48 and accompanying text.
156. See supra notes 88-90 and accompanying text.
157. These firms could perform these services employing relatively inexperienced
and unskilled workers.
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VI. CONCLUSION
The HCDA provides a solid framework for the construction of an
effective enterprise zone program. Without substantial expansion,
however, the Act's impact will be minimal. In light of political con-
straints, the prospects for the needed expansion are cloudy.
Traditionally, Congress is slow to act. Fears of losing politically val-
uable direct expenditure programs may slow the progress of a complete
zone package. In addition, the idea of cutting tax rates, especially for
businesses, is unpopular in Congress due to the federal budget deficit.
Enterprise zone opponents need only raise the issue of the deficit and
many members of Congress grow reluctant to consider tax reduction of
any kind. For these reasons, the most likely scenario is one of Con-
gress begrudgingly passing one element at a time. Through this pro-
cess, the United States may have a complete enterprise zone program,
but it will take time.
Kevin D. Bird
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